Luring others into climate action: Coalition formation games with threshold and spillover effects
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Abstract
We study the effect of leadership in an experimental threshold public ‘bad’ game, where we manipulate both
the relative returns of two investments (the more productive of which causes a negative externality) and the
extent to which the gains from leadership diffuse to the group. The game tradeoffs mimic those faced by
countries choosing to what degree and when to transition from incumbent polluting technologies to cleaner
alternatives, with the overall commitment dictating whether they manage to avert dangerous environmental
thresholds. Leading countries, by agreeing on a shared effort, may be pivotal in triggering emission reductions
in non-signatories countries. In addition, the leaders’ coalition might also work as innovation and technology
adoption catalyzer, thus producing a public good (knowledge) that benefits all countries. In our game, players
can choose to tie their hands to a cooperative strategy by signing up to a coalition of first movers. The game is
setup such that as long as the leading group reaches a pivotal size, its early investment in the externality-free
project may catalyze cooperation by non-signatories. We find that the likelihood of reaching the pivotal size is
higher when the benefits of early cooperation are completely appropriated by the coalition members, less so
when these benefits spillover to the non-signatories. On the other hand, spillovers have the potential to entice
second movers into adopting the ‘clean’ technology.
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1. Introduction
Large scale cooperation on the provision of public goods is essential to overcoming many problems in modern
and past societies, such as the spread of infectious diseases, resource overharvesting leading to either
distributive inequalities (e.g. when countries share international waters) or stock collapse (e.g. in fishery
exploitation), as well as ocean acidification, climate change and other global environmental problems. These
problems have several features in common: (i) they are subject to sudden transitions from more benign states
to harmful ones (tipping points); (ii) addressing them requires widespread cooperation in the face of individual
incentives to refrain from it and ‘free ride’ on the effort of others; and (iii) the prospects of success hinge on
the willingness of some to lead by example. The joint effect of these characteristics is appalling; if all actors
wait for the others to show leadership, catastrophic and irreversible regime shifts may occur (Alley et al. 2003;
Kriegler et al. 2009; Lade et al. 2013; Lenton et al. 2008). Providing the above public goods thus presents a
challenge in terms of conciliating rational choice at the individual level with pro-social behavior. Here we
investigate experimentally whether leadership and innovation diffusion can facilitate addressing such ‘wicked
problem’. Specifically, will the establishment of an institution where a coalition of agents restricts itself in the
use of a polluting technology entice others to follow suit, given that the group collectively risks high losses if
cooperation is insufficient?
While the experiment is framed neutrally1, we will use avoidance of dangerous climate change as an illustration
throughout the paper. To capture (i) and (ii), we consider a discrete public bad. The existence of a known
threshold simplifies the challenge of reaching a meaningful agreement in negotiations, by transforming the
underlying prisoner dilemma’s game into one of coordination (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012). Coordinating
between two Pareto-ranked equilibria is an easier task than escaping the trap of a unique equilibrium where
the dominant strategy is to defect and gamble on the effort of others or the clemency of Nature. However,
even in the presence of a known threshold with the potential to trigger a catastrophe, coordination can be
difficult, especially when the parties have different stakes in the game (Tavoni et al., 2011).
The rationale for focusing on (iii) is that in order to trigger breakthrough advancements in clean energy
technologies, which are necessary for a transition to a low carbon economy that is compatible with economic
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The subjects were confronted with choices among two investment projects, labelled A and B. Compared to a frame that
stressed the moral imperative for action (e.g. to reduce global pollution), this choice might induce less collaborative
behaviour (Liberman, Samuels and Ross, 2004). What we are interested in is treatment effects rather than levels, so the
framing effect on absolute levels of cooperation should wash away. Furthermore, unframed experiments have the advantage
of being less prone to confounding effects originating from the frame.
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growth, major efforts will be needed in both research and development (R&D) and large-scale deployment of
new technologies, as well as in infrastructure development. One can think of electric vehicles as one obvious
example of the magnitude of the required investments. Each country could invest independently in the
required effort. However, this could still be insufficient to bring into reality some of the new technologies at a
large enough scale. At best, this funding scheme will result in inefficient and redundant use of research
funding. Countries (or companies innovating in those countries) might instead resort to common efforts,
standardization, and development of gateway technologies that spark the formation of networks and allow
large scale adoption of new technologies.
Innovation and technology cooperation has been frequently suggested as a possible way out of the
negotiations deadlock (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1995; Barrett, 2003, 2006; Golombek and Hoel, 2004). This is the
first objective of the present analysis, i.e. investigating the implications of linking coalition efforts with the
ancillary benefits stemming from coordinated innovation.
The idea of a collective pursue of innovation, however, brings a new externality into the analysis. If cooperation
on clean innovation hinges on partially sharing the associated collective burden (and benefiting from its yields),
what about those that were not part of the agreement in the first place? Depending on the nature of the
technologies, non-participants could, in principle, be excluded by such benefits, for example through a system
of exclusive property rights. But would this be in the interest of the cooperating group? This is the second focus
of our analysis, namely the role of spillovers.
Technology transfers within coalitions and between signatories and non-signatories have been documented to
occur through climate policies linkages (see for example the work by Dechezleprêtre et al. (2008) and Seres et
al. (2009) on technology transfers through the Clean Development Mechanism), but also simply because of
trade flows, multinational enterprises, and skilled-labor mobility (Eaton and Kortum, 2001, 2006; Keller, 2010).
Although empirical studies can hardly be definitive on the subject, technological transfers have been
highlighted in the theoretical literature as one of the mechanisms that can in principle generate negative
leakage (Golombek and Hoel (2004) and Van der Werf and Di Maria (2008)). Negative leakage occurs when
countries that have not signed an environmental agreement reduce pollution in response to the efforts of an
environmental coalition. This literature suggests that in principle it could be profitable for the coalition to let
non-signatories benefit from the innovations brought about by it.
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The prospects for scaling up climate cooperation nucleating at a small scale, although not necessarily hinging
on the mechanisms of technological spillovers, has received increasing attention in related theoretical work
(Ostrom, 2009; Dietz, et al. 2012; Sterner and Damon, 2011; Vasconcelos, et al., 2013; Tavoni, 2013). Network
diffusion of behaviors and technology adoption may play an important part in catalyzing cooperation, since
adoption by one agent often increases the likelihood that others will become aware of their existence and
potential benefits relative to the status quo. Many studies have shown that that mutually reinforcing choices
lead to accelerating diffusion of a behavior or to the adoption of a technology once a tipping point has been
reached (Granovetter, 1978; Watts, 2002; Weir, 2004). Heal and Kunreuther (2012) focus instead on
coordination in games with strategic complementarity, by resorting to the concept of ‘tipping set’, i.e. “a
subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do
the same”. They argue that international climate agreements have these characteristics, and motivate the
theory with two often mentioned examples of strategic complementarity: the replacement of leaded gasoline
with unleaded gasoline, and the phasing out chlorofluorocarbons through the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Both examples show how unilateral action initiated by a subset of actors (in the
United States) prompted others to follow suit immediately after2. This body of work suggests that unilateral
action by a subset of agents might hold promise for promoting widespread cooperation notwithstanding the
threat of free riding.
In the present paper, we investigate experimentally the role of increasing returns to coalition size (mimicking
increasing returns to scale in innovation and adoption of clean technologies), as well as the implications that
proprietary versus open knowledge policies might have. We employ a threshold public ‘bad’ game that is setup
to test how these mechanisms play out in deterring or incentivizing players to be part of a coalition of early
investors, or in responding to the coalition if they decide to stay out.

This experiment departs from standard public goods games in at least three ways: the presence of a threshold,
which transforms it in a game of coordination with two Pareto-ranked equilibria (tipping point avoidance and
gamble, as explained below); the possibility to form a coalition of Stackelberg leaders who invest in a
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Experimental work has also shed light on the role of leading by example in facilitating the provision of public goods
(Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003; Levati et al., 2007). Using a public bad experiment, Moxnes and van der Heijden
(2003) ask themselves the following: “With regard to global or regional environmental problems, do countries that take
unilateral actions inspire other countries to curtail emissions as well”? They find “a small but significant effect of a leader
setting the good example”, provided that the example is sufficiently ‘good’ (i.e. leader investments in the public bad are
sufficiently low). Relatedly, İriş et al. (2014) find that contributions to a threshold public good drop when the investment
decision is delegated to an appointed leader. This effect is attributable to the fact that delegates appear to focus on the
lowest contribution level suggested by non-delegates (rather than the highest or average suggestions). Hence, negative
examples can be detrimental to cooperation.
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technology which is socially superior, but individually more costly; and the existence of technological spillovers
that may be appropriated by the coalition or may diffuse to non-members.

We show that a narrow focus on targets is unlikely to be effective in catalyzing climate cooperation, since it
exposes cooperators to the ‘tyranny of free riders’ refusing to take on sufficiently ambitious mitigation efforts.
Such well-known negative result is alleviated when i) there exist increasing returns to entering in a coalition
that are completely appropriated by the coalition and that are high enough to attract a pivotal group of
participants; or ii) the fringe can partake in the benefits generated by the coalition, thus acting proactively even
though from outside the coalition. This finding casts new light on the problem, by highlighting the gamechanging potential of linking a climate agreement with technological agreements and the strategic implications
of restricting access to the new technology.

Before detailing the experimental design in Section 3, we describe the main features of the game in the next
section. Section 4 discusses main findings of our experiments and Section 5 draws some conclusive remarks.
2. The game
In this section we introduce the set-up of the game. We first present the dilemma with the main notation and
constraints. Then we provide the stages of the game, to shed light on how coalition formation and
technological cooperation can help coordination. Finally, we solve the game by backward induction.
2.1 The threshold public bad game
Consider 𝑁 symmetric subjects playing a linear public bad game with a threshold. Each of them has an initial
endowment 𝑒 and decides how much to allocate between a high return but socially costly Project A (public
bad) and a lower-return investment in an alternative project which does not cause negative externalities,
Project B. The endowment is thus split between 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 = 𝑒 − 𝑥𝐴 . Investing in Project A (B) gives a private
return of 𝑟𝐴 (𝑟𝐵 ). Returns on Project A are larger than returns on Project B, 𝑟𝐴 > 𝑟𝐵 > 0, but Project A has also a
negative external effect: each unit invested in A yields a negative return of 𝑐𝐴 to all subjects.
In addition to this traditional negative externality game, the group’s aggregate investment determines whether
a ‘tipping’ point has been reached. Namely, a threshold T determines the maximum safe collective investment
in A. This threshold is common knowledge and can be interpreted as admissible global CO2 concentrations that
are compatible with full enjoyment of private earnings. To make the problem relevant, this safe level has to lie
below the maximal public bad investment capacity (𝑁𝑒). Players thus retain their earnings with certainty
5

(tipping point avoidance) if 𝑁𝑥𝐴 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑁𝑒; otherwise, with probability 𝑝 they will be left with 𝑞 ∈ [0, 1) of
their private earnings (gamble).
Subjects’ payoff function then takes the form:
𝜋(𝑥𝐴 , 𝑥𝐵 ) = 𝑟𝐴 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑟𝐵 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝐴 ∑ 𝑥𝐴 ,
{
𝜋(𝑥𝐴 , 𝑥𝐵 ) = (1 − 𝑝)[𝑟𝐴 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑟𝐵 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝐴 ∑ 𝑥𝐴 ] + 𝑝𝑞[𝑟𝐴 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑟𝐵 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝐴 ∑ 𝑥𝐴 ],

𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑥𝐴 = 𝑋𝐴 ≤ 𝑇
𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑥𝐴 = 𝑋𝐴 > 𝑇

(1)

Where 𝑁, 𝑒 ∈ 𝑅 + , 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 ∈ [0, 𝑒] and 𝑐𝐴 < 𝑟𝐴 − 𝑟𝐵 < 𝑐𝐴 𝑁 . The first inequality means that the private net
return of Project A is larger than the return of Project B: 𝑟𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴 > 𝑟𝐵 ; and the second inequality means that
the individual opportunity cost of investing in the clean technology B is lower than the social marginal cost of
pollution 𝑐𝐴 𝑁. The latter inequality is in line with the existing empirical evidence (Stern, 2007; IPCC, 20143).
The social optimum entails that all players refrain from investing in A altogether.4 In this case each subject gets
𝜋(0, 𝑒) = 𝑟𝐵 𝑒. But this is not an equilibrium, as each player has an incentive to deviate. By increasing 𝑥𝐴 by
one unit, any individual can get 𝜋(1, 𝑒 − 1) = 𝑟𝐴 + 𝑟𝐵 (𝑒 − 1) − 𝑐𝐴 (while others get 𝜋(0, 𝑒) = 𝑟𝐵 𝑒 − 𝑐𝐴 ). As
long as the net return of Project A is larger than that of Project B the deviation pays off . Hence the dilemma
arises as each individual strictly prefers invest everything in A, assuming all others refrain from investing.
Obvioulsy, as more subjects follow this line of reasoning, the lower is everyone’s expected payoff (because of
the gradual negative externality term 𝑐𝐴 ∑ 𝑥𝐴 as well as of the stochastic implications of crossing the
threshold). Risk-neutral players will either coordinate on threshold avoidance, or disregard the externality and
make the most from investment in A. These two symmetric Nash equilibria correspond to 𝑥𝐴 = 𝑇/𝑁 and
𝑥𝐴 = 𝑒 and are Pareto ordered. We denote with π the payoff associated with the tipping point avoidance
(𝑥𝐴 = 𝑇/𝑁), and call π the payoff obtained when putting all eggs in Project A (𝑥𝐴 = 𝑒).

2.2 Making coordination happen: coalition formation with technological cooperation
into capture the element of leadership we introduce a membership stage where players can opt to be part of a
coalition. Being part of a coalition means signing up to a pre-specified investment strategy that is linked to the
number of individuals who sign the agreement. In particular, the smaller the coalition, the more effort each
coalition member is required to do in terms of constraining her/his investment in Project A. In what follows, we
identify by 𝑠 the number of members signing up to the coalition. For any 𝑠 ∈ [2, 𝑁 − 1], each coalition member
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More precisely see Working Group III, Chapter 10 – Mitigation: potential and costs, section “Social and environmental
costs and benefits” pp. 851.
4
This choice is made to mimic the nature of the climate change problem: in order to keep temperature below the agreed
2°C, global emissions will need to be nil by mid-century (IPCC 5th AR WGIII Summary for Policy Makers, 2014).
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invests less than the equal share guaranteeing threshold avoidance: 𝑥𝐴𝑠 = 𝑋𝐴𝑠 /𝑠 < 𝑇/𝑁.
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Following the

membership stage, those opting not to be in the coalition, non-members 𝑛 ∈ [𝑁 − 𝑠], are free to choose their
investment given information on the size and aggregate investment of the coalition.
𝑖
The resulting total investment in A can be then expressed as 𝑋𝐴 = 𝑋𝐴𝑠 + 𝑋𝐴𝑛 = ∑𝑠𝑖=1 𝑥𝐴𝑖 + ∑𝑁
𝑖=𝑠+1 𝑥𝐴 . This

determines the group’s performance with respect to the threshold T, as well as the externality cost, 𝑐𝐴 𝑋𝐴 , both
affecting each individual’s payoff.
We now explore the case where returns to Project B increase with the size of the coalition, thus reducing the
returns gap between the two investment alternatives. Inspired by the literature on multi-issue bargaining
(Schelling, 1960), we assume that members of the coalition, by curtailing investments in Project A, also
increase the productivity of Project B. Adoption of new technologies typically entails several externalities and
the rational of our set up is that, by getting together, players are leveraging on the coalition size to reduce
those externalities, thus reducing the return wedge between the two technologies. The larger 𝑠, the greater
this positive externality on Project B is. Hence 𝑟𝐵 (1 + 𝑠𝐼) is the increased return to B resulting from a coalition
of size s, where 𝐼 ∈ [0,1) is the percentage rate of technological improvement. 6
In order to account for this positive externality, the payoff to its beneficiaries takes now the form:
𝜋̂(𝑥𝐴 , 𝑥𝐵 ) = 𝑟𝐴 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑟𝐵 (1 + 𝒔𝑰)𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝐴 𝑋𝐴 ,
𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝐴 ≤ 𝑇
{
𝜋̂(𝑥𝐴 , 𝑥𝐵 ) = (1 − 𝑝 + 𝑝𝑞)[ 𝑟𝐴 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑟𝐵 (1 + 𝒔𝑰)𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝐴 𝑋𝐴 ], 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝐴 > 𝑇

(2)

We investigate two alternative setups for what concerns the implications for the fringe of technological
cooperation among signatories. In the first case, the positive externality is appropriated by coalition members’
only, with non-signatories payoffs given by (1). In a second setup we assume that this positive externality
diffuses to the fringe as well, whose payoff then also follows equation (2). We refer to these as the no spillover
and the spillover cases, respectively.
We now move on to the discussion of the actual parameters and treatments utilized in the laboratory, while
we refer to Appendix 1 for the equilibrium solution of the two stage game.

5

Under this assumption, average investment by non-members above 𝑇/𝑁 can still be compatible with avoiding the
probabilistic loss triggered when exceeding 𝑇.
6
To keep the social dilemma set up, we impose that 𝑟𝐵 (1 + 𝑁𝐼) < 𝑟𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴 , i.e. even when all subjects cooperate, the net
return of Project A remains larger than the increased return of Project B.
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3. Experimental design and hypotheses tested
Groups of 𝑁 = 7 subjects face an unframed game, in neutral language. Each player is endowed with 𝑒 = 50
experimental currency units (1 ECU corresponding to 0.05 Euros), which are to be entirely allocated between
two projects, A and B. Each unit invested in A yields an individual return 𝑟𝐴 = 10 and causes a cost𝑐𝐴 = 1 to
each group member; investment in B yields a lower return 𝑟𝐵 = 6, but carries no external cost, 𝑐𝐵 = 0. The
threshold is set at 𝑇 = 105ECU= 30% 𝑁 ∗ 𝑒, meaning that for a group to avoid the probabilistic losses, it has
to limit collective investment in A to at most 30% of total endowment (or equivalently invest at least 70% in
externality-free Project B). Otherwise, all subjects in a group face a 50% probability of losing their earnings:
𝑝 = 0.5 and 𝑞 = 0.
With regard to the increased competitiveness of Project B resulting from coalitional investments in it, we test
the following cases: 𝐼 = {0%; 2%; 7%}. We will refer to I=2% as the condition with Low Innovation returns,
and to I=7% as the case with High Innovation returns.7 We also manipulate whether the returns to innovation
are appropriated by coalition members only, or benefit the fringe as well (Spillover condition).
We test for the effect of four conditions, yielding the five treatments (and the control one) which are sketched
out in Table 1. The threshold public bad game without coalition formation stage serves as benchmark (T0). It
consists solely of the investment decision stage, where players simultaneously and independently choose their
investment in Project A (and which determines the residual, if any, to be invested in B). T1 captures the
implication of the addition of a membership stage with coalition formation, while the remaining four
treatments differ in the returns to innovation (T2 and T4) as well as in who its beneficiaries are(T3 and T5).
COALITION

𝑰 = 𝟐%

𝑰 = 𝟕%

SPILLOVER

T0 (Threshold Public Bad Game)
T1 (Coalition)



T2 (Coalition & Low Innovation)





T3 (Coalition & Low Innovation with Spillover)





T4 (Coalition & High Innovation)





T5 (Coalition & High Innovation with Spillover)









Table 1. Features of the different treatments
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Recalling (2), for positive I and coalition size s, the return to B increases to 𝑟𝐵 (1 + 𝑠𝐼).
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In particular, subsequent treatments explore the implications of increasing returns to coalition participation.
Returns from Project B are increased proportionally to the coalition size, hence reducing the return wedge
between the two investments (Appendix 2 reports the full parameterization for different treatments).
However, while in T2 and T4 only coalition members benefit from this increase in Project B returns, in T3 and
T5 every player can benefit.
As an illustration, Table 2 reports the information given to players at the membership stage for treatment T1
(additional information on implications for Project B returns and whether they were available to coalition
members only or to all players were provided under other treatments and are summarized in Appendix 2). This
includes levels of investment in Project A each member is going to be tied to and how they vary depending on
the resulting coalition size.8 The table also reports, for each coalition size, the remaining allowed investment in
Project A for non-members which is consistent with investments not exceeding the threshold, both at the
group (penultimate row) and individual level (assuming symmetric behavior, bottom row).9 This information is
also provided again to non-signatories at the investment strategy stage, together with information concerning
the actual size of the coalition that has formed.
Number of participants joining a coalition (s)
7 (all)

6

5

4

3

2

Investment in Project A for each member (ECU)

15

13

11

9

7

5

Aggregate investment in Project A by the coalition (ECU)

105

78

55

36

21

10

Amount left to be invested before reaching 105 ECU

0

27

50

69

84

95

Corresponding symmetric individual investment not to exceed 105 ECU for nonmembers

0

27

25

23

21

19

Table 2 – T1 (Coalition Only): Information provided to players during the game

Once information about investments by non-signatories are collected, each player is informed on the resulting
aggregate investment in A, whether the threshold has been crossed or not, and her/his final payoff (conditional
on the 50% probability for instances where the threshold has been crossed). Finally, for instances where the
threshold is crossed a virtual coin is tossed and the effective payoff is communicated to the group. The full
Table containing information for other treatments, including the potential improvement to Project B returns
induced by coalition size, are reported in Appendix 2.
8

For the limit case of the grand coalition, the parameterization replicates the symmetric cautious equilibrium.
In the treatments with coalition (T1 to T5), subjects were informed that a coalition only forms if at least 2 participants in
the group choose to join a coalition and that members of a coalition cannot alone guarantee that the sum of all investments
in Project A stays below 105 ECU, except when all 7 join the coalition.
9
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The experiment was conducted between May 2013 and February 2014 in the BELSS Lab at the Bocconi
University (Italy). We recruited 434 subjects (respectively 70, 84, 63, 70, 77 and 70 subjects in Treatment 0, 1,
2, 3, 4 and 5), corresponding to between 9 and 12 independent group observations per treatment. No subject
participated in more than one session. Sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and were run on visually
isolated computer terminals. For programming the interactive games, we used the software z-tree (Fischbacher
2007). Subject earned 13.20 Euros on average.
At the beginning of a session, written instructions with a neutral frame (context and language of the
experiment abstracted from interpretations of any sort) were provided to the subjects. Before starting the
experiment, subjects completed a comprehension questionnaire to ensure that they fully understood all the
procedures.
Each session consisted of 2 practice rounds and 8 independent rounds, i.e. the subjects played the game
described above 10 times. The subjects were informed that only the 8 independent rounds would be
considered to determine the final payout. At the beginning of each round subjects were randomly assigned to
groups of seven and were given an endowment 𝑒 = 50 to be used in the investment decision. They were not
aware of whom they were grouped with and each subject was not matched up with the same other 6
participants for more than a single round. At the end of each round, the participants were informed of their
(potential) earnings for the round, given their choices and the choices made by the other 6 group members.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid according to one randomly selected round (out of the 8
rounds). Payments were settled at the end of the experiment in cash. Since subjects were informed that the
round to be selected for payment was determined randomly, and could be any of the non-practice rounds, it is
reasonable to expect that they played as if each round was payoff-consequential. Before moving to the results,
let us discuss the set of hypotheses that we set out to test.
The first conjecture refers to the potentially positive effect that leadership signaling per se may have in
catalyzing cooperation. By comparing Treatments 0 and 1, we are able to assess whether the opportunity to
form a coalition changes the aggregate investment behavior. The experimental literature seems to confirm the
theoretical prediction of small coalitions that only partially internalize the externality by investing slightly more
in the public good than in voluntary contribution mechanisms (Dannenberg et al., 2014). Certain design
features, such as imposing a minimum participation rule or introducing an endogenous rule for determining
coalitional contributions, increase cooperation. In our game, where the latter features are absent, we expect
that Treatment 1 will induce the formation of small coalitions and little switch away from the public bad.
10

The second conjecture is that increasing the returns of being in the coalition (by increasing returns to Project B
to coalition members only) increases the willingness to be part of the coalition. Treatment 2 offers coalition
members an increased return to Project B that is proportional to the number of participants and this effect is
stronger in Treatment 4. We expect the coalition to be largest in T4, followed by T2 and T1.
As far as the fringe is concerned, two conflicting mechanisms are at work. On the one hand, the theory on
leadership suggests that larger coalition sizes may induce pro-social behavior in non-signatories as well by
making the target within reach (Kosfeld et al., 2009). Therefore, in response to larger coalitions in T4 and T2, a
reduction in average Project A investment by the fringe may occur. On the other hand, as the constraint on
investment in A by non-coalition members becomes less binding as the coalition size increases (see Table A2),
free riding incentives will pull in the opposite direction. The third conjecture is that these two opposing effects
will (partly) cancel out and the overall group success in avoiding the tipping point will be mostly determined by
the number of signatories. Combining the second and third conjecture, we hypothesize that success will be
higher in T4, followed by T2 and T1.
A different set of incentives comes into play in treatments where innovation benefits spillover to non-coalition
members as well (T3 and T5). First, fewer subjects will sign up early on to the coalition, compared to
treatments where the benefits are appropriated by the coalition only (due to the larger return gap between A
and B). This forms the basis for our fourth conjecture, namely that individuals will response to the spillover
condition by less likely enrolling in the coalition (coalition size in T3 should be smaller than in T2, and also in T5
compared to T4).
Ceteris paribus, reduction in coalition size should in turn reduce both the pivotal and the free riding effects,
again with inconclusive effects. However, under spillovers the fringe benefits from a smaller opportunity cost
of investing in Project B due to the reduced wedge on returns. The fifth conjecture is thus that when the
increased returns to B spillover to non-members, the fringe will invest less in Project A (comparing T3 to T2,
and T5 to T4). The fourth and fifth conjectures point in opposing direction with regards to overall group success
in tipping point avoidance, so we resort to empirics to establish which effect (shrinking coalition size versus less
uptake of the polluting technology by the fringe) dominates.

4. Results
In our analysis, three are the crucial indicators of group performance: the size of the coalition (𝑠), the
frequency

of

threshold

crossing

(𝑇 + )

and

the

total

investment

in

the

public

bad
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(𝑋𝐴 ), which determines the group’s distance from the threshold (by how much investments are below or above
T). The last metric is relevant as it captures the gradual component of the external costs of investing in A. In
Table 3 we report the summary statistics for these key indicators across all treatments. The first four rows of
the table recall the basic assumptions for each of the treatments, while the bottom six report the statistics
concerning the basic indicators of performance. All numbers reported are averages over all periods.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of results

ASSUMPTIONS

T0

T1

T2

(Threshold

(Coalition)

(Coalition

Public

Bad

Game)
Number of stages
Coalition effect on costs

1
-

2
None

T3

T4

(Coalition & Low

(Coalition

Low

Innovation

High

Innovation

Innovation)

Spillover)

Innovation)

Spillover)

2

2

2

2

Internal only

&

Internal and

with

T5
&

Internal only

(Coalition & High

Internal and

Repetition of game with random clustering

8

8

8

External
8

8

External
8

𝑰: Increased return to B per member (𝒔 ≥ 𝟐)

-

0%

2%

2%

7%

7%

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

T0

T1

T2

T3

T4

T5

𝒔 ; 𝑵 − 𝒔 (coalition size; fringe size)

-

1.7 ; 5.3

2.5 ; 4.5

1.8 ; 5.2

4.3 ; 2.7

2.5 ; 4.5

𝑿𝑨 (Total Investment in Project A)

191

166

154

136

117

139

𝑿𝒔𝑨 (Total Investment in Project A by the
Coalition)

-

6.5

6.8

6.3

9.7

7.4

𝑿𝒏𝑨 (Total Investment in Project A by the Fringe)

27.3

28.8

29.4

23.6

27.1

25.6

𝑻+ (Groups that exceeded T)

89%

83%

81%

68%

56%

59%

By how much above T

82%

58%

47%

30%

11%

32%

Let’s begin with the most conservative criterion to assess treatment effects in this game, failure to avoid
crossing the threshold. Figure 1 Shows that while in T0, T1 and T2 the vast majority of groups fails to stay below
the target (failure rates above 80%), in T3, T4 and T5 failure rates drop to around 60%. Similarly, total
investments in Project A in this second group of treatments is significantly lower, as summarized in Table 3. We
will devote the remaining of this section to the analysis of the mechanisms underlying these results.
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with

Above T (T+)

89%

***

83%

81%

**

*

68%
56%

***

***

***

***

***

***

T0

T1

T2

T3

T4

59%

T5

Figure 1: Percentage of groups that exceeded the threshold T. Lines emphasize statistical differences across
treatments (***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1)

To summarize the treatment effects along many metrics, in Table 4 we map the differences across conditions in
five indicators discussed thus far. Namely, in addition to total investment in A (𝑋𝐴 ) and coalition size (s), we
compare total and average fringe investment in A (𝑋𝐴𝑁 , 𝑥𝐴𝑁 , respectively), to get a sense of the relative
implications that different incentives have on non-signatories’ behavior.
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T1 (Coalition)

T0 (Threshold Public Bad
Game)

< **

T2 (Coalition & Low
Innovation)

< ***

T3 (Coalition & Low
T5 (Coalition & High
T4 (Coalition & High
Innovation with
Innovation with
Innovation)
Spillover)
Spillover)
< ***

< ***

< ***

< ***

< ***

< ***

> ***

T1 (Coalition)

> ***

> ***

< ***

< ***

< ***

< **

< ***

< ***

< ***

< ***

< ***

< ***

T2 (Coalition & Low
Innovation)

> ***

< **

< ***

< ***

<*

< ***

< ***

< ***

T3 (Coalition & Low
Innovation with Spillover)

< ***

< ***

< ***

< **

< **

< ***

> ***

> ***

< **
< ***
> ***
< ***

T4 (Coalition & High
Innovation)

> ***
< **

Table 4. Statistical differences in treatments (column versus row), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reported
entries are at least significant at the 10% level according to the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The table
is read starting from the column treatment (e.g. total investment in A, 𝑋𝐴 ,is significantly lower in T1 than in T0,
and coalition size 𝑠 is significantly larger in T2 than in T1).
Comparing T0 with T1 (first row and first column in Table 4), we find that the option of signaling leadership is
helpful as total investment in A is significantly reduced in T1, but not sufficiently to significantly reduce the
probability of crossing the threshold (which happens 83% of times in T1). This finding confirms, in a discrete
public bad setting, the theoretical result advanced by Barrett (1994) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) that the
option to form coalitions with voluntary participation leads only to modest improvements. This pessimistic
result has been confirmed experimentally for linear public goods10, but to our knowledge the present
experiment is the first to show the limited gains brought about by voluntary coalition participation in a setting
where lack of restraint in the use of a technology (the public bad) causes negative and potentially catastrophic

10

See Dannenberg et al., 2014 for a recent experiment, and references therein for earlier experimental work on coalition
formation.
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externalities. As we will see below, coalition formation becomes much more consequential (as measured by
the metrics in Table 4), once it is interacted with the other conditions.
In order to test our second conjecture, we need to compare T1, T2 and T4. We find that individuals’ propensity
to join a coalition responded to the innovation incentives as expected. The larger the innovation benefits, the
larger the coalition size (as evident from the differences in T2 and T4 relative to T1 and T2, respectively).
How did the fringe respond to the increasingly larger leading group in T2 and T4? Is the leading by example
effect prevailing, or is it free riding? Alternatively, it may be that the two effects largely balance each other out,
as laid out in our third conjecture. In our experimental sample, when the innovation benefits are low, the two
effects cancel each other out: the coalition is larger in T2 with respect to T1, but there is no statistical
difference in either the overall investment in Project A, nor in the failure rate in avoiding the tipping point.
However, conjecture three is not confirmed when looking at larger benefits from innovation (T4). Under T4, the
incentives to participate in a voluntary coalition are highest, and the subjects responded by signing up to it
more frequently than in other treatments: the average number of participants increases to four out of seven.
The implication of a larger coalition is that the leadership effect prevails over the free riding effect. Both the
total investment in Project A and, more interestingly, the average fringe investment are significantly lower in
T4 than in T2. This suggests that for leadership to be effective a critical mass is necessary. The resulting
implication is that, overall, threshold crossing is significantly lower in T4 compared to any of the other
treatments investigated so far (T0, T1 and T2).
Conjecture four is confirmed: treatments where innovation benefits spillover to the fringe (T3 and T5) imply a
significant reduction in the coalition size, with respect to the equivalent treatment with no spillovers (in T3 𝑠 is
smaller than in T2 and, similarly, 𝑠 is smaller in T5 than in T4). Note however that while this difference is
statistically significant in both cases, the drop in coalition size that is witnessed when comparing T5 to T4 is
much larger in magnitude (with average coalition dropping from 4.3 in T4 to 2.5 in T5, a value that is
comparable to the small coalition size observed in T1 and T2). This bears important implications for the overall
reaction of the fringe, which is a key determinant of the threshold crossing indicator (𝑇 + ).
Lastly, spillovers reduce the average fringe investment as suggested in conjecture five. However, what this
implies for the whole group is influenced by the actual size of the fringe. Let us first discuss the behavior of
non-signatories comparing T3 with T2. Spillovers reduce the coalition size, but given that this effect is only
marginal, the negative implications of this reduction are more than compensated by the proactive behavior
that spillovers induce in the fringe investment strategy. The average Project A investment by each fringe
member, 𝑥𝐴𝑛 , is lower in T3 than in T2 (and in T1), and the probability of crossing the threshold is reduced. A
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different balance of these effects is at play when comparing T5 with T4: although 𝑥𝐴𝑛 is again smaller in T5, this
is not enough to compensate for the large drop in coalition size relative to T4 (from 4.3 to 2.5, on average).
The results from pairwise comparisons are confirmed by the linear regressions reported in Table 5, which also
allows us to control for potential learning effects, as well as other individual fixed effects.

T2
T3
T4
T5

𝑋𝐴𝑛

𝑥𝐴𝑛

s

T+

T+

0.587***

-0.0278

0.0675

-18.88**

0.500

(0.195)

(0.0690)

(0.0620)

(8.861)

(1.136)

0.0146

-0.158**

-0.156***

-29.79*** -5.182***

(0.189)

(0.0670)

(0.0596)

(8.604)

2.285***

-0.277***

0.0945

-81.91*** -1.745

(0.184)

(0.0653)

(0.0682)

(8.388)

0.677***

-0.246***

-0.136**

-35.83*** -3.228***

(0.189)

(0.0670)

(0.0605)

(8.604)

(1.098)

s

(1.098)
(1.081)

-0.162***
(0.0157)

Constant

2.494***

0.622***

1.027***

125.2***

25.34***

(0.206)

(0.0730)

(0.0758)

(9.381)

(1.211)

Round Dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

416

416

416

416

412

R-squared

0.349

0.108

0.296

0.262

0.150

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5. OLS regression on Group level data. Reference treatment is T1. T0 is excluded from the analysis
The first column looks at the impacts on coalition size, whereas the second and third models predict threshold
crossing, while the last two columns report model results for total and average fringe investments. The
coalition size is significantly larger in treatments T2, T4 and T5 than in T1 (1% significance) but it is not in T3 (T0
is excluded as it does not feature coalition formation. However, the probability of crossing the threshold is
significantly lower in T3, due to the behavior of the fringe. Looking at total and average investments one can
clearly notice how self-restraining behavior by the average fringe member is maximized in T3 (last column in
Table 5). T4, on the other hand, implies the largest coalition size, and hence the minimum total investment in
Project A by the fringe. This, as noted above, follows from the increased participation in the coalition rather
than from the fringe behavior (whose average investment in A remains largely unchanged).
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We further search for individual features that might influence either the individual amounts invested in A or
the choice to be in the coalition or the level of investments in Project A for those participants that are not part
of the coalition (using a random effect robust regression).

-7.63***

In
coalition
0.21***

-3.86

(2.18)

(0.05)

(2.45)

-9.16***

0.11**

-8.50***

(2.02)

(0.04)

(2.23)

𝑥𝐴
T2
T3

𝑥𝐴𝑛

-11.56*** 0.42***

-5.46***

(1.76)

(0.04)

(1.94)

-8.80***

0.21***

-5.87***

(1.98)

(0.04)

(2.07)

2.45**

-0.05**

2.39*

(1.08)

(0.03)

(1.23)

0.10**

-0.01**

0.09*

(0.04)

(0.00)

(0.05)

0.48**

-0.00

0.64***

(0.21)

(0.00)

(0.246)

0.37

3.91e-07

0.411

(0.279)

(0.00)

(0.3)

2.78***

-0.06***

2.06***

(0.63)

(0.01)

(0.75)

-2.07

0.09***

-0.94

(1.27)

(0.03)

(1.37)

Controlling for Rounds

Yes

yes

yes

Constant

6.61
(4.73)

0.59***
(0.12)

9.41*
(5.43)

Observations

2800

2800

1761

Number of subject number

350

350

342

T4
T5
Gender (0-Male; 1-Female)
Understand
Risk aversion (life metric)
Risk aversion (finance metric)
Prominent Player (0-same; 1-less)
Nationality (0-foreigner; 1-italian)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6. Results of the random effect robust regression on individual data. Reference treatment is T1.

A few words on the non-self-explaining additional regressor variables used in the individual is deemed
(Appendix 3 reports the descriptive statistics). “Understanding” is a continuous variables coded between 0 and
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100 that maps the numbers of correct answers to the preliminary questionnaire we run to make sure
individuals have correctly understood the basic structure of the game. Risk aversion was self-reported both
framed in the context of life-threatening risk and in the context of financial risks. Finally, the “Prominent
player” variable encodes the answer to the question: “Suppose in the game you just played you were the
representative of your group. So, the remaining 6 participants in your group will do the same choices as you. If
you were to repeat the same experiment as the one you just took part in, what would be your choice as a
leader?” and was only asked in treatments T1 to T5.
When looking at individual investment in A by the subjects, unconditional on their choice at the coalition
stage, and controlling for treatments and round effects, gender, risk aversion measured through the life threats
question and understanding seem to have a very mild implications. The strongest and most significant effect
seems to be associated with the Prominent Player variable, suggesting that individuals who have invested more
in Project A might have constrained themselves more were they able to trust or, better, enforce reciprocity of
the group. The decision to enter the coalition and the investments for those in the fringe only follows a very
similar pattern.

5. Discussion

We have explored empirically the prospects of cooperation in a threshold public bad game designed to capture
the tradeoffs faced by countries choosing to what degree to transition from incumbent polluting technologies
to cleaner alternatives, with the overall commitment dictating whether they manage to avert dangerous
climate change.
Our analysis suggests two possible situations. The first is one where the potential benefits of innovation
generated within agreements fostering early investments in a clean technology are deemed very large. The
expected returns to cooperation are sufficiently large that a pivotal number of participants is lured into action.
The fringe also reacts proactively to the diminished burden they have to shoulder. Ex-ante it would make sense
to promote this process by committing to some form of appropriation of the knowledge created within the
coalition.
The second scenario is one where the expectations from the new technology are more modest. In this case, our
experiment suggests that the negotiation is likely to result in a coalition which is not large enough to be pivotal.
Leveraging on the effort of second movers by fostering clean technology uptake by the fringe would be
recommendable here.
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Specifically, in order to disentangle the push and pull factors behind the incentives to join environmental
agreements (and more broadly behind technology adoption), we have introduced several modifications to the
threshold public bad game employed in the baseline treatment. These modifications capture some realistic
features of current negotiation platforms and may ease the problem of equilibrium selection. Namely, we
incrementally add: (i) a membership stage where motivated investors in the ‘green’ technology can lead by
example and (partially) correct the externality; (ii) a first mover advantage of differing magnitudes, which
increases the competitiveness of the ‘green’ technology; (iii) the presence of spillovers benefitting second
movers with the same increased return to the green technology as the one enjoyed by early investors.
The temporal dimension introduced with the above conditions leads to nontrivial strategic effects. Effectively,
non-signatories play a game of their own, where the maximal safe investment in the ‘dirty’ technology is
determined by the number of those that showed leadership by restricting themselves in its use. In particular,
the interplay of (i)-(iii) can either catalyze or deter investments in the clean technology, by affecting
participation to the treaty and consequently the incentives for the fringe. From the point of view of the latter,
the presence of leaders (i) has potentially conflicting effects. This is due to the coexistence of increased free
riding incentives (the target is within reach and second movers may optimistically assume that others will take
it upon themselves to restrict their use of the polluting technology) and opposite incentives to cooperate (early
commitments to the common good may entice the fringe to follow suit). Increased competitiveness of the
socially preferable technology (ii) will affect both groups differently, depending on whether the third condition,
spillovers to the fringe, is active.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the two treatments where the subjects cooperated most are those in which it is less
costly to do so, i.e. the gap in the cost between the clean and the polluting investments is smallest. The
distribution of burdens between the two groups, however, is rather different. While most of it is taken on by
the coalition when its members retain the benefits of R&D, the reverse is true when R&D benefits trickle
through to the fringe: coalition size drops by about 40%, but the fringe, lured by the spillovers, embraces the
new technology. This effect is even more marked when the magnitude of the benefits from R&D in clean
technology is smaller: here the drop in coalition size is more modest under positive spillovers, while the effect
on fringe behavior remains strong, leading to a significantly higher chance of avoidance of the threshold for
dangerous climate change.
These findings point to the importance of adding R&D to the bargaining table in climate negotiations. Reducing
the cost-effectiveness gap with respect to the incumbent technology (e.g. fossil fuels) by means of investments
by a set of motivated innovators, may suffice to lure more reluctant players towards an environmentally
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superior, but individually more costly alternative. Our results suggest that especially when investments in R&D
can only provide limited returns, all the parties are better off when followers can also profit from these
investments.
Of course, caution must be used when extrapolating to the climate negotiations. Unfortunately, the problem
we face has many more layers of complexity, including asymmetry of payoffs for different countries and
uncertainty about the location of the threshold for dangerous climate change. These will make the matter of
coordination more difficult, as agreement is inevitably harder to reach when objectives differ and the target is
fuzzy. In terms of asymmetries, even in our simple setup we note that the timing element introduces
differences in incentives and expected payoffs between the leaders and the followers. In fact, we find that in
groups that successfully avoided the threshold the average investment in the clean technology is about the
same in the fringe and in the coalition. Conversely, in unsuccessful groups the average fringe investment in the
public good was only half than the corresponding investment by a signatory, further evidence of the
importance of coordinating on equitable burdens. Uncertainty about the threshold works in a similar direction,
by hindering its role as a coordination mechanism and pulling parties towards widespread defection. We
maintain that it is therefore all the more important to induce participation by the more reluctant players, and
our experimental findings suggest that the diffusion of innovation may be an important lever for climate action.
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Appendix 1: Equilibrium solutions of the 2-stage game
To provide the equilibrium solutions, we solve the game using backward induction, beginning with the fringe
decision.
Fringe investment stage:11
The threshold public bad game is played by the non-members. The reasoning holds for both no spillover and
spillover cases.
 When 𝑠 < 2, no coalition forms in the membership stage. The game is characterized by the two
equilibria described above.
 For any 𝑠 ∈ [2, 𝑁 − 1), non-members play the threshold public bad game with a different effective
threshold than the one contemplated by members in the prior stage, as the latter have already
invested part of their endowment in A. The threshold for the group of non-members becomes
𝑋𝐴𝑛 = 𝑇 − 𝑋𝐴𝑠 . Again, risk-neural non-members will either coordinate on tipping point avoidance, or
gamble and invest their total endowment in A. For each possible coalition size, there are thus two
symmetric equilibria: non-members invest respectively 𝑥𝐴𝑛 = (𝑇 − 𝑋𝐴𝑠 )/(𝑁 − 𝑠) or 𝑥𝐴𝑛 = 𝑒.
 When 𝑠 = 𝑁 − 1, the best-response of the sole pivotal non-member is unique and it is to coordinate
with the coalition, i.e. to choose 𝑥𝐴𝑛 = 𝑇 − (𝑁 − 1)𝑥𝐴𝑠 .
 When 𝑠 = 𝑁, there is no fringe and each subject contributes to reach the Pareto superior equilibrium
investing the pre-determined amount 𝑥𝐴𝑠 = 𝑇/𝑁, thus guaranteeing loss avoidance.
Membership stage:
Using the concept of internal and external stability (d’Aspremont et al. 1983), for a coalition to be stable two
conditions must hold: a member has no incentive to leave (internal stability: 𝜋 𝑠 (𝑠) > 𝜋 𝑛 (𝑠 − 1)), and a nonmember has no incentive to join (external stability: 𝜋 𝑛 (𝑠) > 𝜋 𝑠 (𝑠 + 1)). Call s* the stable coalition size. As we
just established the fringe investment stage has several equilibria. Below we provide the stability conditions
when members and non-members coordinate on threshold avoidance.12 We provide the reasoning for both no
spillover and spillover respectively.
No spillover:
11

In this paper we consider only the symmetric equilibria. Hence, we restrict attention to symmetric investments by fringe
individuals and coalition members, 𝑥𝐴𝑛 and 𝑥𝐴𝑠 respectively. Nonetheless note that in addition to this equilibria the game
between non-members has also multiple asymmetric equilibria ensuring avoidance of the tipping point, as any investment
profile such that 𝑋𝐴 = 𝑇 is a Nash equilibrium.
12
Note that the reasoning for the inefficient equilibrium is the same except that payoffs are multiplied by (1 − 𝑝 + 𝑝𝑞) as
non-members invest their full endowment 𝑒 in Project A such that 𝑋𝐴 > 𝑇.
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Payoffs at the safe equilibrium when being member and when being non-member are respectively:
𝑠
𝜋 (𝑠) = 𝑟𝐴 𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠) + 𝑟𝐵 (1 + 𝑠𝐼)(𝑒 − 𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠)) − 𝑐𝐴 𝑇
𝑛
𝜋 (𝑠 − 1) = 𝑟𝐴 𝑥𝐴𝑛 (𝑠 − 1) + 𝑟𝐵 (𝑒 − 𝑥𝐴𝑛 (𝑠 − 1)) − 𝑐𝐴 𝑇

The stability function (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992) is:
𝑠
𝑛
𝜋 (𝑠) − 𝜋 (𝑠 − 1) = (𝑟𝐴 − 𝑟𝐵 )[𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠) − 𝑥𝐴𝑛 (𝑠 − 1)] + 𝑟𝐵 𝑠𝐼 (𝑒 − 𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠))

(3)

Let’s start with the case 𝐼 = 0 (i.e. no technological improvement): no coalition is stable when 𝑟𝐴 > 𝑟𝐵
𝑠
𝑛
𝑠
𝑛
(i.e. 𝜋 (𝑠) − 𝜋 (𝑠 − 1) < 0, ∀𝑠). When 𝐼 > 0, 𝜋 (𝑠) − 𝜋 (𝑠 − 1) is negative (positive) if the gain of leaving

the coalition (𝑟𝐴 − 𝑟𝐵 )[𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠) − 𝑥𝐴𝑛 (𝑠 − 1)] is higher (lower) than the additional revenue thanks to the
technological cooperation 𝑟𝐵 𝑠𝐼 (𝑒 − 𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠)). In other words, a stable coalition (bringing together at least two
subjects) is achievable if technological cooperation brings enough additional revenue to members such that it
compensates the loss of not leaving the coalition.13

Spillover:
Similarly, payoffs at the cautious equilibrium are:
𝑠

𝜋 (𝑠) = 𝑟𝐴 𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠) + 𝑟𝐵 (1 + 𝑠𝐼)(𝑒 − 𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠)) − 𝑐𝐴 𝑇
𝑛

𝜋 (𝑠 − 1) = 𝑟𝐴 𝑥𝐴𝑛 (𝑠 − 1) + 𝑟𝐵 (1 + (𝑠 − 1)𝐼)(𝑒 − 𝑥𝐴𝑛 (𝑠 − 1)) − 𝑐𝐴 𝑇
The stability function becomes:
𝑠
𝑛
𝜋 (𝑠) − 𝜋 (𝑠 − 1) = [𝑟𝐴 − 𝑟𝐵 (𝑠 − 1)𝐼] (𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠) − 𝑥𝐴𝑛 (𝑠 − 1)) + 𝑟𝐵 𝐼 (𝑒 − 𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠))

(4)

With 𝐼 > 0, the gain of leaving the coalition (𝑟𝐴 − 𝑟𝐵 (𝑠 − 1)𝐼)[𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠) − 𝑥𝐴𝑛 (𝑠 − 1)] is smaller than when there
is no spillover and has to be compared with the additional revenue originating from the presence of one
additional member: 𝑟𝐵 𝐼 (𝑒 − 𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠)). Given the assumption on 𝑥𝐴𝑠 (𝑠) increasing in s, the latter decreases in 𝑠.
As a consequence, for a stable coalition to be achievable, the first term has to decrease more in 𝑠 than the
second term. Comparing equations (3) and (4), it becomes apparent that it is more difficult to achieve a stable
coalition when technological improvement spills to non-members.
Appendix 2: Returns to Project A and Project B

13

Stable coalition sizes under both no spillover and spillover are further detailed in the next section for the
parameterization considered in the experiment and subgame perfect equilibria of the game are provided. The latter will
be denoted {s ∗ ; XA∗ } defining the stable coalition size and the corresponding total investment in A.
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For treatments where the implications of innovation were tested and the return wedge between Project A and
B was reduced proportionally to coalition size, the information on the change in the returns to Project B was
provided at the membership stage, in addition to the information presented in Table 2 in the main text (for the
sake of simplicity, in Table A2 we lump together different information that was provided in different
treatments).
Depending on the treatment, participants were informed either told that the returns would apply to coalition
members only, or to all players.
No
Coalition

Number of coalition members

7 (all)

6

5

4

3

2

0

Gross return from Project A (T0 –T5)

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

Return from Project B to all (T1)

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

Return from Project B to members only (T2) [to everybody in T3]

6.8

6.7

6.6

6.5

6.4

6.2

6

Return from Project B to members only (T4), [to everybody in T5]

8.9

8.6

8.1

7.7

7.3

6.8

6

Table A2 – Returns to Project A and B under different treatments and coalition sizes

27

Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics and additional regressors in the individual model.
Variable |

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

-------------+---------------------------------------------------------Gender

|

364

.5961538

.4913427

0

1

Understand |

364

88.47604

10.49185

46

100

Risk av. (life)|

364

5.123626

2.454791

1

11

Risk av. (finance)|

364

5.167582

2.136381

1

11

Prominent Player|

350

1.948571

1.000106

0

4

Nationality |

364

.7912088

.4070043

0

1

-------------+----------------------------------------------------------

The Prominent Player question was asked to participants to treatments T1 to T5 and was phrased as follows:

“Suppose that you are the representative of your group. Therefore, the remaining 6 participants in your group
will be bound to your decision. If you were to repeat the same experiment as the one you just took part in,
what would be your choice as a leader?”

The Understanding Questionnaire is available from the authors upon request.
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Appendix 4: ISTRUCTIONS TO STUDENTS FOR T0
(Instructions for other treatments as well as Ztree codes are available from the authors upon request)

Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment.
This experiment is about decision-making. Please read carefully the whole instructions. The instructions will
help you to understand correctly the experiment. Once all the participants to the experiment have read the
instructions, an assistant will read them aloud and the experiment will begin.
Your earnings in this experiment will depend upon your decisions and the decisions made by other participants.
All your decisions will be anonymous. In the experiment all amounts are stated in ECU (Experimental Currency
Units) and at the end of the experiment, your earnings will be converted into Euros. The exact procedure is
detailed at the end of the instructions.
From now on and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have any questions, raise
your hand and an assistant will come to answer your questions privately.
RULES OF THE GAME
The experiment consists of 2 practice rounds and 8 independent rounds (which will be used to determine your
final payout, as explained at the end).
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 7 participants (including yourself).
In each round, each of you is given 50 ECU to be used in the investment decision detailed below. You will not
know who the other 6 participants in your group are.
The group assignment will change after every round. You will not be matched up with the same other 6
participants for more than a single round.
THE INVESTMENT DECISION
All of you will face the same decision-making problem: to decide on how you will use the 50 ECU. You can
invest it in two different projects: Project A and Project B. You decide how much you want to invest in Project
A; the remaining part of your 50 ECU is then automatically invested in Project B.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Project A: Each ECU invested in Project A yields a direct payoff of 10 ECU. In addition to the payoff to yourself,
each ECU invested in Project A yields a cost of 1 ECU to you and to each of the other 6 participants in your
group.
Similarly, investments in Project A by any other participant yield a cost to you and to each of the other
participants.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Project B: Each ECU invested in Project B yields a direct payoff of 6 ECU. No additional cost is charged for
investing in Project B.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Once all the participants in your group have decided on how to invest the 50 ECU between Project A and
Project B, net earnings will be calculated.
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If the total sum of ECU invested by the participants in your group in Project A is equal or below 105
ECU, each of you will be paid according to the investment decisions in your group (see next section for
details).



However, if the total sum of ECU invested by the participants in your group in Project A is greater than
105 ECU, you and the rest of your group will lose all your earnings with 50% probability.

COMPUTING EARNINGS
Your earnings at the end of a round are calculated as follows:
Earnings = ECU invested in Project A x 10
+ ECU invested in Project B x 6
– Sum of all investments in Project A
If the sum of all investments in Project A in your group is equal or below 105 ECU, you will keep the earnings
for sure; if the sum of all investments in Project A in your group is greater than 105 ECU, your earnings will be 0
with 50% probability (and as above with 50% probability).
Example 1: assume that you invest 30 ECU in Project A: you receive a direct payoff of 300 ECU from Project A (=30x10). The
remaining 20 ECU (=50-30) are automatically invested in Project B and yield a payoff of 120 ECU (=20x6). Together this
generates a direct payoff of 420 ECU (=300+120).
Assume furthermore that the other 6 participants in your group invest on average 30 ECU in Project A. That gives a total
investment of 180 ECU (=30x6) in Project A for these 6 persons. Together with your own investment of 30 ECU, this gives a
total investment in Project A of 210 ECU (=180+30). This yields a cost of 210 ECU for you (and for each of the other
participants). A direct payoff of 420 ECU minus a cost of 210 ECU gives you final earnings of 210 ECU.
However, as the sum of all investments in Project A exceeds 105 ECU, the related earnings for you and the rest of your
group will be 0 with 50% probability.

Direct payoff from
Project A

Direct payoff from
Project B

Sum of all investments in
Project A

Net Earnings

30ECU x 10 = 300ECU

20ECU x 6 = 120ECU

30ECU + 30ECU x 6 = 210ECU

50% probability: 300 + 120 - 210 =210ECU
50% probability: 0

Table 1 – Earnings in Example 1

Table 2 below summarizes the earnings for several combinations of investment decisions in Project A by you
and the other 6 participants.
To limit the size of the table, we only mention investments in steps of 5 ECU. However, you can use all integers
from 0 up to and including 50 when you choose your investment in Project A. To know your corresponding
earnings when investments differ from those reported in the table, you can then use the general formula
provided above.
The first column provides your investment decision in Project A, whereas the first row is the mean investment
decision in Project A by the other participants in your group. Inside the table you can find your earnings in ECU
associated with such choices.
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Note that the shaded part of the table provides the combinations of choices for which the sum of all
investments in Project A exceeds 105 ECU. The related earnings will be the value in the shaded area with 50%
probability and 0 with 50% probability.
Mean investment by the
others

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

0

300

270

240

210

180

150

120

90

60

30

0

5

315

285

255

225

195

165

135

105

75

45

15

10

330

300

270

240

210

180

150

120

90

60

30

15

345

315

285

255

225

195

165

135

105

75

45

20

360

330

300

270

240

210

180

150

120

90

60

25

375

345

315

285

255

225

195

165

135

105

75

30

390

360

330

300

270

240

210

180

150

120

90

35

405

375

345

315

285

255

225

195

165

135

105

40

420

390

360

330

300

270

240

210

180

150

120

45

435

405

375

345

315

285

255

225

195

165

135

50
450
420
390
360
330
300
270
Table 2 – Earnings arising from the investment decisions made by you and the others.

240

210

180

150

Investment by you

PROCEDURE FOR MAKING YOUR DECISION
In this experiment, you are asked to choose your investment level in Project A. You can choose any integer
from 0 up to and including 50 when you choose your investment in Project A. The remaining part of your 50
ECU is then automatically invested in Project B.
Remind that if the total sum of ECU invested by the participants in your group in Project A is equal or below
105 ECU, each of you will get his earnings according to the investment decisions in your group. However, if the
total sum of ECU invested by the participants in your group in Project A is greater than 105 ECU, you and the
rest of your group will lose all your earnings with 50% probability.
The corresponding individual investment to not exceed 105 ECU if all participants invest the same amount (i.e.
105 ECU divided by 7 participants) is 15 ECU.
At the end of each round, you will be informed of your earnings given your choice and the choice made by the
other 6 participants in your group.
Once the experiment is completed you will receive the payout corresponding to the earnings in one randomly
selected round (out of the 8 rounds; note that the 2 practice rounds are not evaluated for payment purposes).
Payments are settled at the end of the experiment, in cash, according to the following exchange rate: 1 ECU =
0.05€. Since the round to be selected for payment will be determined randomly, and could be any of the nonpractice rounds, you should behave in each round as if it was the relevant one for payout.
Before we start the experiment, we would like to give you some review questions to ensure that you fully
understand all the procedures. Once all the participants have answered the questions, the experiment will
begin. Should you have any questions, feel free to raise your hand to ask for assistance.
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